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Note: The Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act-Marital Age Provisions
I. INTRODUCTION
The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1970 pro-
posed a Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act' containing, among
other provisions, restrictions on marital age. This Note will ex-
amine the relevant provisions of the Act in light of some of the
sociological findings on teenage marriage. It will also examine
the statutory pattern of marriage regulation in the United
States and present some of its weaknesses. The Uniform Act
will then be compared with the present statutes in terms of
minimization of those weaknesses and maximization of the goals
of marital age restrictions.
II. THE MARITAL AGE PROVISIONS
The age regulations of the Uniform Act provide the follow-
ing: 1) parties may marry at age 18 without parental or judicial
consent 2 [hereinafter referred to as marriageable age3]; 2) par-
ties between the ages of 16 and 18 [hereinafter referred to as
the intermediate age group] are allowed to marry if they ob-
tain either parental or judicial consent, the latter being given
only where the court finds marriage to be in the party's best in-
terest and that he or she has the capacity to assume the respon-
sibilities of marriage;4 3) parties under 16 [hereinafter re-
1. Approved and recommended for enactment August 1-7, 1970,
Rev. 1971 [hereinafter referred to as UNiFonm ACT].
2. [License to Marry.] When a marriage application has been
completed and signed by both parties to a prospective marriage
and at least one party has appeared before the [marriage li-
cense] clerk and paid the marriage license fee of [$ ], the
[marriage license] clerk shall issue a license to marry and a
marriage certificate form upon being furnished:(1) satisfactory proof that each party to the marriage
will have attained the age of 18 years at the time the
marriage license is effective, or will have attained the age
of 16 years and has either the consent to the marriage of
both parents or his guardian, or judicial approval; [or, if
under the age of 16 years, has both the consent of both
parents or his guardian and judicial approval;] ....
U~iromv DIVORCE AND MARpiAGE AcT § 203 (1970) (Rev. 1971). All op-
tional provisions are discussed herein as effective provisions of the UNI-
FORm AcT.
3. The terms, such a "marriageable age," used herein are not re-
flected in all the state statutes and are used here only for convenience.
4. See note 2 supra.
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ferred to as the age of capacity] are allowed to marry only
with parental and judicial consent, pregnancy not being the
determinative factor in the granting of judicial consent;5 and 4)
underage parties and their parents have the right to sue for an-
nulment of a marriage contracted in violation of the above pro-
visions,6 but only if they act before the underage child reaches
the age at which he could marry without the omitted require-
ment.7  Finally there are miscellaneous provisions applying to
all applicants: waiting periods and evidentiary requirements.8
5. [Judicial Approval.](a) The [ ] court, after a reasonable effort has been
made to notify the parents or guardian of each underaged party,
may order the [marriage license] clerk to issue a marriage li-
cense and a marriage certificate form:
(1) to a party aged 16 or 17 years who has no parent
capable of consenting to his marriage, or whose parent or
guardian has not consented to his marriage; [or
(2) to a party under the age of 16 years who has the
consent of both parents to his marriage, if capable of giving
consent, or his guardian.](b) A marriage license and a marriage certificate form
may be issued under this section only if the court finds that the
underaged party is capable of assuming the responsibilities of
marriage and the marriage will serve his best interests. Preg-
nancy alone does not establish that the best interests of the
party will be served ....
UNIFORm ACT § 205.
6. [Declaration of Invalidity.]
(a) The [ ] court shali enter its decree declaring the
invalidity of a marriage entered into under the following cir-
cumstances:
(3) a party [was under the age of 16 years and did
not have the consent of his parents or guardian and judicial
approval or] was aged 16 or 17 years and did not have the
consent of his parents or guardian or judicial approval; or
(b) A declaration of invalidity under subsection (a) (1)
through (3) may be sought by any of the following persons and
must be commenced within the times specified, but in no event
may a declaration of invalidity be sought after the death of
either party to the marriage:
(3) for the reason set forth in subsection (a) (3), by
the underaged party, his parent or guardian, prior to the
time the underaged party reaches the age at which he could
have married without satisfying the omitted requirement.
(e) Unless the court finds, after a consideration of all rele-
vant circumstances including the effect of a retroactive decree on
third parties, that the interests of justice would be served by
making the decree not retroactive, it shall declare the marriage
invalid as of the date of the marriage. The provisions of this
Act relating to property rights of the spouses, maintenance,
support, and custody of children on dissolution of marriage are
applicable to non-retroactive decrees of invalidity.
UNIrFoRM ACT § 208.
7. Id.
8. [License, Effective Date] A license to marry becomes ef-
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I. THE GOAL OF MARITAL AGE REGULATION
Age restraints have generally been believed necessary to
prevent hasty and immature marriages and thus promote sta-
bility of the marriage relationship.9 The fear is that teenage10
marriages are likely to end in divorce because many young peo-
ple do not have the capacity to meet the problems incident to
marriage. Some commentators, however, have suggested that
the proper goal of marriage legislation should be easy access to
marriage rather than stability." They argue that the costs of
the present system of controls outweigh its benefits. For ex-
ample, many proposed marriages which would be successful are
presently denied legal sanction, with the result that many cou-
ples form relationships outside the law which do not receive the
stability of the legal title of "husband and wife." The societal
cost of an illicit relationship would appear to be greater than any
cost of allowing the marriage. Furthermore, commentators argue
that the present restrictions are ineffective in that a couple may
avoid them by lying about their ages or traveling to a state with
more favorable laws.12
fective throughout this state 3 days after the date of the is-
suance and expires 180 days after it becomes effective, unless
the [ ) court orders that the license is effective when issued.
UNomv ACT § 204. See note 2 supra for evidentiary provisions as to
age and parental consent.
9. In C. FOOTE, R. LEvy, & F. SANDER, CASES AND MATERIus ON
FALmmY LAW 194 (1966), age regulations are discussed as "protections
against immature or hasty marriage ... ." In In re Barbara Haven, 86
Pa. D. & C. 141, 143 (Orphan's Ct. 1953), such regulations are discussed
in terms of restraining "impetuous youth." Comment, The Validity of
Child Marriages in Louisiana, 14 TUL. L. REv. 106, 107 (1939), lists the
need for maturity as one of the reasons for restriction. Wisc. STAT. ANN.
§ 245.05 (Supp. 1971) requires that the applicants be given a card which
reads in part: "It is the intent of Chapters 245 to 248 to promote the
stability and best interests of marriage and the family."
10. "Teenagers" will hereafter refer to those under the most
common statutory marriageable age-21 for males and 18 for females.
11. Monahan, Does Age at Marriage Matter in Divorce?, 32 SocIAL
FoRcEs 81, 87 (1953): "If assistance were given quite generally, in place
of interference, the results . .. might be different." See also Gallaher
& Levy, Youth Marriage: Summary and Critique of the Data and
Literature, Appendix C, appearing in, R. LEVY, UNIFORM MARRIAGE ANM
DIVORCE LmisAIETZON: A PRErmnNvy ANALYSIS, at C-60, 61 (Prepared
for the Special Committee on Divorce of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws): "And perhaps, even, the cul-
ture may find its way to acceptance of love and affection being fully
expressed between young people, without the normative concomitant
of marriage and family."
12. Burchinal, Research on Young Marriage: Implications for Fam-
ily Life Education, 9 FAmIY LIF= COORDINATOR 6, 20 (1960) ("21 per-
cent of the 18 year old brides and 12 percent of the 20 or 22 year old
19721
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Although the prefatory note to the Act suggests that sta-
bility of marriage is the goal of age regulations,' there is much
to suggest that the draftsmen, if not the commissioners, favored
maximum access to marriage and that stability was of only
secondary concern. 1 4 They were skeptical that age restrictions
do or could effectively promote stability 15 and concerned that
the benefit of present legislation does not outweigh the loss of
individual freedom occasioned by restriction.1" Nevertheless,
the Act incorporates many of the present statutory restrictions,
apparently out of the fear that otherwise it would not receive
serious consideration. 17
Despite the ineffectiveness of present age regulation and the
loss of individual autonomy caused by the restrictions, this Note
assumes that stability of marriage is a proper goal. The costs
of divorce can be great both for society and the individual in-
volved. Children suffer from parental dispute and one-parent
homes, 8 and economic hardship may ensue to both the husband
who is paying alimony and the wife with children to support.
However, it is also assumed that these restrictions should not is-
brides (primary marriages) were non-state residents"); Lowrie, Early
Marriage: Premarital Pregnancy and Associated Factors, 27 J. MARR.
FAM. 48 (1965) ("[found] some migration to marry out of the county,
more frequently out of the state, to evade legal restrictions"); Plateris,
The Impact of the Amendment of Marriage Laws in Mississippi, 28 J.
MAR. FAM. 206, 207 (1966) ("Before the marriage laws were amended a
very high proportion of brides and grooms married in Mississippi were
residents of other states attracted by very permissive premarital re-
quirements .... Before 1958 about two thirds of those married in
Mississippi were nonresidents . . . ."); Rosenwaike, Parental Consent
Ages as a Factor in State Variation in Bride's Age at Marriage, 29 J.
MAI. FAM. 452, 455 (1967) ("The parental consent laws, rather than
deterring marriage, contribute to migratory marriage").
13. "Without undermining the state's interest in the stability of
marriages, the Act . . .simplifies . . .regulation." Prefatory note to
the UNIFORM ACT.
14. Interview with Robert J. Levy, Reporter to the Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, Special Committee on Divorce, in Minneapolis,
Minnesota, April 4, 1972.
15. "[D]oes it make any sense to establish an elaborate statutory
and administrative structure which will be used for formalities alone-
either because permission to marry will always be given or because,
when permission to marry is denied, the applicants will often ignore the
decision?" R. LEVY, UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LEGISLATION: A
PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 26 (Prepared for the Special Committee on
Divorce of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws).
16. Interview with Robert J. Levy, supra note 14.
17. Id.
18. See Burgess, The Single-Parent Family: A Social and Socio-
logical Problem, 19 FAMILY LIFE COORDINATOR 137 (1970).
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sue when the benefits of the resultant stability are less than the
cost of interfering with the personal lives of individuals.
A further assumption is made as to intermediate goals in
achieving marital stability. The present statutes attempt both
to deter'9 teenage marriages and evaluate proposed marriages
by means of parental consent. Since there appears to be ample
reason to advise against youthful marriage,20 and since it is
axiomatic that stability is served by reliable rather than unre-
liable evaluation of a proposed marriage's chance of success, this
Note will assume that both deterrence and reliable evaluation
are proper intermediate goals in achieving stability.
IV. DATA ON YOUTHFUL MARRIAGE
Age restrictions rest upon assumptions as to the likelihood
and probable causes of divorce in early marriages and the effec-
tiveness of various regulations in deterring them. A brief sum-
mary of the data available on youthful marriage is therefore
appropriate.2 1
First, it appears that marriages between younger persons
will be less stable than marriages between older persons. One
study, for example, found that the ratio of divorces to mar-
riages for those under age 21 was .29 for males and .24 for fe-
males, while the corresponding ratios for those between 21 and
19. See Comment, The Validity of Child Marriages in Louisiana,
14 TuL. L. REv. 106 (1939) ("The reasons usually ascribed for such re-
strictions on child marriages are: . . . (2) it is desirable for the better
development of the race that marriages of very young people be
avoided; .. ." (emphasis added) ). See also In re Barbara Haven,
86 Pa. D. & C. 141, 143 (Orphan's Ct. 1953) ("The statute in question
... fulfills a two-fold function in protecting marriage as an estate and
in placing a restraining hand upon the shoulder of impetuous youth.")
The court was dealing with the requirement of judicial consent, but
it is clear it was referring to age restrictions generally. Some com-
mentators are apparently convinced that one purpose of the statutory
age restrictions is to deter youthful marriage. Burchinal, Trends and
Prospects for Young Marriages in the United States, 27 J. MhAm FAM.
243, 253 (1965) ("There are justifiable grounds for discouraging young
marriages." (emphasis added) ). Gover & Jones, Requirement of Paren-
tal Consent: A Deterrent to Marriage? 26 J. MARn. FAM. 205 (1964)
("If it is assumed that parents generally are opposed to early marriage
and will, if given a chance, prevent their daughters from marrying at
early ages, it is reasonable to hypothesize that the laws requiring formal
parental consent are a deterrent to early marriage.").
20. See note 22 infra.
21. For an excellent and more complete summary, see Gallaher &
Levy, Youth Marriage: Summary and Critique of the Data and Litera-
ture, appearing in, R. Lvv, UNIFoRM MARRIAGE AND DrvoacE LscsA-
TroN: A Pmn~nmARY ArALysis at Appendix C.
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25 was .14 and .11.22 Since the hazard of failure in teenage mar-
riage is obviously important in evaluating the potential bene-
fits of age restrictions, and since most studies conclude that
there is a significantly greater risk of divorce in teenage mar-
riage,2 3 the basic assumption of marital age regulation appears
to be correct.
Second, although there is some disagreement, 24 the average
marital age appears to have declined over the last several de-
cades. 25  Various explanations are offered for the finding of
variations in marital age including industrialization ,2 economic
trends,2 7 the greater percentage of women in the population,2 8
availability of nonmarital intercourse,29 and sociological dis-
22. Monahan, supra note 11, at table 3.
Because divorces in one year do not come from marriages in
that particular year, but from all preceding years (in a con-
stantly diminishing degree), a non-comparability obtains when
we set marriage and divorce data in tables covering the same
time period .... [i]f the pattern of age at marriage were
changing rapidly, such a comparison could be grossly misleading.
Id. at 81.
For calculations of the increased risk of divorce in teenage marriage,
see J. LANDIS & M. LANDIS, PERSONAL ADJUSTMIENT: MARRIAGE AND
FAMILY LIVING, 174, 177 (1971) (several times); Burchinal, Trends and
Prospects for Young Marriages in the United States, 27 J. MARa.
FAM. 243, 249 (1965) (between two to four times); Furlong, Youthful
Marriage and Parenthood: A Threat to Family Stability, 19 HASTINGS
L.J. 105, 109 (1967) (two to three times). The California Assembly In-
terim Committee Reports (1963-1965) indicate that marriages where one
party is under age 20 are almost twice as likely to end in divorce. Final
Report of the Assembly Interim Committee on Judiciary: Relating to
Domestic Relations, Part 2: Youthful Marriage and Parenthood-A
Threat to Family Stability, 25-61, Appendix D, Vol. 23, No. 6 (Jan. 11,
1965).
23. A number of studies in addition to the few cited in this
section make use of statistical data on marriage stability, in one
form or other. . . . [I]t is impossible to characterize them in
any one general statement, other than to say they all support, to
one degree or another, the generalization that younger mar-
riages tend to be less stable than later ones.
Gallaher & Levy, supra note 21, at C-18.
24. Some sociologists report that the average age of marriage has
remained stable since 1950. Burchinal, Research on Young Marriage:
Implications for Family Life Education, 9 FAMILY LIFE COORDINATOR 6, 7
(1960); Parke & Glick, Prospective Changes in Marriage and the Fam-
ily, 29 J. MARu. FAM. 249, 251 (1967). There is apparently no alarming
increase.
25. Moss, Teen-Age Marriage: Cross-National Trends and Socio-
logical Factors in the Decision of When to Marry, 27 J. MARR. FAM. 230,
233 at table 4 (1965).
26. Moss, supra note 25, at 230.
27. Furlong, supra note 22, at 108.
28. Parke & Glick, supra note 24, at 256.
29. Moss, supra note 25, at 240.
(Vol. 57:179
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organization.3" Conspicuously absent from the list are legal re-
quirements. If legal requirements do not affect the age at which
people marry, then one assumption upon which age restrictions
rest-that they deter youthful marriage-is incorrect, and the
resultant costs of legal restrictions will not be offset by any in-
crease in stability.
Since the number of youthful marriages has varied over the
years while the laws have for the most part remained the same,
other factors may be primarily responsible for the decision to
marry young. Sociological and cultural variants have been pre-
sented as the determining factors.31 Apparently no sociologist
has identified the law as the determining factor,32 and studies
in Mississippi and South Carolina indicate that age restrictions
do not affect the age of marriage.33
However, there are explanations for the failure of the regula-
tions to adequately increase stability in addition to the inef-
fectiveness of legal regulations as a means of influencing the
age of marriage. There is evidence that regulations are not en-
forced. 34 Furthermore, some states invite underage marriages
by regulations that are easily evaded,3" and many young people
may travel to such a state to be married. Thus any conclusion
as to the deterrent effect of marital age regulations is tentative
until there is uniformity and effective enforcement.
Third, many factors other than age are associated" with the
30. Id. at 236.
31. Moss, supra note 25, at 230.
32. See, e.g., Rosenwaike, Parental Consent Ages as a Factor in
State Variation in Bride's Age at Marriage, 29 J. MAn. FAIM 452, 455
(1967): "The parental consent laws, rather than deterring marriage, con-
tribute to migratory marriage."
33. Gover & Jones, Requirement of Parental Consent: A Deterrent
to Marriage?, 26 J. MAm. FmvL 205 (1964); Plateris, The Impact of the
Amendment of Marriage Laws in Mississippi, 28 J. MAn . FA . 206(1966). Both Mississippi and South Carolina enacted legislation plac-
ing greater restrictions on marriage. Both states began requiring proof
of legal age. It was believed that many teenagers were evading the
regulations through lying about their age. Mississippi enacted waiting
periods and proof of parental consent. The result of the Mississippi
study: "Contrary to expectation, teenage marriages ... declined [in
percentage comparison] only slightly more than the total number of
marriages . .. " Plateris at 209. The result of the South Carolina
study: "There is, however, no evidence from the South Carolina data
to support the hypothesis that the requirement of parental consent is a
deterrent to early marriage." Gover & Jones at 206.
34. Burchinal, supra note 12.
35. Lowrie, supra note 12.
36. However, no causal relationship between these factors and the
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risk of failure in youthful marriages,31 so that age alone is an
insufficient indicator.38 Among the factors are lack of educa-
tion, premarital pregnancy, short acquaintance before marriage,
limited number of dating partners, maturity, social adjustment,
low socio-economic status, strongly opposed parents, elopement
and civil ceremony, economic dependence upon parents and liv-
ing with the parents after the marriage.3 9 There is no agree-
ment as to the relative weight to be given to each factor.'40  Be-
cause these other factors are associated with the risk of failure
in youthful marriages, a policy directed solely at regulating the
age of marriage may not be effective. Discouraging marriage at
a given age will not eliminate the difficulties associated with low
socio-economic status or lack of education in those marriages that
are permitted. A rational legislative choice to use age restric-
tions must recognize that even if regulations deter youthful mar-
riage they may not solve the problem.
risk of marital failure has been identified. Gallaher & Levy, supra
note 21, at C-12.
37. Id. at C-10.
38. Burchinal, Trends and Prospects for Young Marriages in the
United States, 27 J. MARR. FAm. 243 (1965): "Age per se is not an
adequate criterion for predicting marital confidence, but numerous
factors related to readiness for marriage are reasonably well correlated
with age."
39. Id. at table 5.
40. For example, note the discussion of the macroscopic as opposed
to the microscopic evaluation of youthful marriage problems in Gallaher
& Levy, supra note 21, at C-7-10. Sociologists taking the macroscopic
approach would ascribe cultural variants as the important factors, where-
as those taking a microscopic approach would focus more on psychologi-
cal factors. An important question left unanswered as a result of this
lack of agreement is to what extent the data can aid in predicting suc-
cess in youthful marriage. The reporter to the Commissioners on Uni-
form Laws in his preliminary analysis related that "[t]he data avail-
able is insufficiently reliable to permit more than very tentative hy-
potheses" and that "[p]resent predictive skills are fairly primitive .... "
R. LEVY, UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LEGISLATION: A PRELIMINARY
ANALYSIS 23, 35. Yet one sociologist believes that forecasts of success
and failure can be made by utilizing the factors associated with those
youthful marriages that fail and those that succeed:
With the presence of an increasing number of negative factors,
forecasts for competent or satisfying relations would become
more doubtful; whereas with the presence of an increasing num-
ber of positive factors, more competent or successful marital and
parental interaction could be expected.
Burchinal, supra note 38, at 252. It appears that only limited forecasts
can be made in any given case. However, under both the present sys-
tem and the Uniform Act someone is to evaluate for the child his pro-
posed marriage's chance of success. That evaluation would be more
meaningful if use is made of the available data.
[Vol. 57:179
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V. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT STATUTES
AND UNIFORM ACT PROVISIONS
A. MARIAGEABLE AGE
In setting 18 as the age at which parties may marry without
parental consent,41 and in treating males and females alike, the
Uniform Act reflects a trend in the states,42 even though about
half of the states still require either that both parties be 214
or that the male be 21 and the female 18.44 It appears that the
41. At common law a male of 14 or a female of 12 could enter into
a valid marriage. 1 BLACKSTONE, CozwmiENrmaS 436 (1807). The age
requirements were based upon both contract law and the ability to
reproduce.
Just as the law requires, for ordinary contracts, that a party
thereto must have reached an age sufficient to give him rea-
sonable discretion, so, in connection with the contract of mar-
riage, the law has required that the parties be not too imma-
ture.
Kingsley, The Law of Infants' Marriages, 9 VAND. L. REv. 593 (1956).
The ages of puberty were considered to be 14 for males and 12 for fe-
males. LA. CIV. CODE art. 36 (1870) (common law ages adopted for
marriage laws). Today the justification commonly given for age re-
strictions is that they are necessary to prevent hasty and immature
decisions to marry. See note 9 supra.
42. A number of states allow both males and females to marry at
age 18 without restriction. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 4101 (West 1970)
(amended 1971); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-204 (1961), as amended, Ga. Acts
1972, no. 862; Ky. REv. STAT. § 402.210 (1972); ASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 207,
§ 7 (1969) (amended 1971); MicE. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 551.103 (1967)
(amended 1968); MIss. CODE ANN. § 461 (1942) (statute unclear); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 57-1-5 (1962), § 13-13-1 (1953) (amended 1971); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 51-2 (1966); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, §§ 1-5(c) (1965), as amended,
Pa. Acts 1972, no. 152; S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-24 (1962); S.D. Compn
LAWS ANN. § 26-1-1 (1967) (amended 1972); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-408
(1955), as amended, Tenn. Acts 1972, Ch. 545; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 5142, tit. 1, § 173 (amended 1971); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-48, 49 (1960)
(amended 1972); WAmSH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.04.010 (1961) (amended
1970); Wyo. Acts (1971), Ch. 247 (in effect only if voters approve in
November 1972 a constitutional amendment lowering the voting age to
eighteen). In addition some allow marriage without parental con-
sent for both males and females at 19. ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.011
(1962) (amended 1970, males 19, females 18); DmL. CODE ANx. tit 13,
§ 123 (1953) (amended 1969); IowA CODE ANN. § 595.3 (1950), as
amended, Iowa Acts 1972, house file 1011; MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 48-143
(1947) (amended 1971); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-105, § 38-101 (1968), as
amended, Neb. Acts (1972) leg. bill 1086; Ttx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.51
(1971) (males 19, females 18). It should be noted that most of these
states still discriminate between males and females in establishing the
age of capacity. See note 54 infra.
43. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46-5g (1958); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 741.04 (1964); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 97 (West 1952); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 3101.01 (Page 1960), § 3109.01 (Page 1972); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 48-1-8 (1966).
44. ALA. CODE tit. 34, § 10 (1958); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-122
1972]
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Uniform Act set 18 as the marriageable age in order to eliminate
the inconsistency of treating an 18 year old as mature enough to
vote and be drafted but not mature enough to marry without
consent.45 However, deciding for whom to vote may require
different skills than those required to decide whether to marry
and maintain a successful marriage. The fact that marriages
of persons in their teens are more divorce prone' 0 than others
lends some support to this proposition. The rationale of the
Act may be that even though 18 year olds may not generally
be mature enough for marriage47 they should not be required
to assume the burdens of adulthood without the full rights of
adults. However, insofar as the goal is stability of marriage,
age restrictions should be based upon a judgment as to the age
at which the probability of divorce declines to an acceptable
level.48
Discrimination between males and females with respect to
marriageable age has persisted in the United States. While the
origin of the discrimination may lie in the difference in age of
puberty,49 it has apparently continued partly because females
(1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 55-102 (1971); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN.
§ 30-111 (1968); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-202 (1963); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 89, § 3 (Smith-Hurd 1966); IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-202 (1965); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 23-106 (Supp. 1971); MD. ANN. CODE art. 62, § 9 (1972);
MiNN. STAT. § 517.02 (1969); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 451.090 (1952); NEV. Ray.
STAT. § 122.020 (1965); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-6 (1968); N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW § 15 (McKinney 1964); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-02 (1971); ORE.
Rav. STAT. § 106.060 (1971); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 15-2-11 (1969);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-9 (1969).
45. [I]t is consistent with the trend in federal as well as state
law to lower to 18 the age at which persons are permitted to vote
and to make autonomous decisions about important matters af-
fecting their lives.
UNIFORM ACT § 203, comment.
46. See Monahan, supra note 22, at table 3.
47. The view might also be that the ratio of divorces to marriages
is at an acceptable level for 18 year old females and that it would be
either unconstitutional under the proposed Equal Rights Amendment
or unwise to discriminate against males, even though the ratio of
divorces to marriages is at an unacceptable level for males.
48. The touchstone is, of course, "acceptable," which must take into
account not only the probability of divorce but the efficacy of the
age restrictions and one's perceptions of the costs of the restrictions.
In terms of probability alone, the data in note 22 supra would support
the choice of 18 for females, but not for males.
49. The amendment of 1934 changed the minimum ages from
fourteen for males and twelve for females to eighteen and six-
teen, respectively. The original age limits had been based on
puberty.
Comment, The Validity of Child Marriages in Louisiana, 14 TUL. L.
REv. 106, 107 (1939). "Since a principal end of marriage is procreation,
the parties should have this capacity. . . ." Id. at 106.
[Vol. 57:179
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marry sooner than males.Y' However, the Uniform Act makes
no sexual distinction; sociological data does support this choice
for those under 18. Marriages of males under 18 have been
found in one study to be as stable as marriages of females under
18.51 Furthermore, the proposed "Equal Rights" Amendment5 2
may preclude such discrimination.53 But even in the absence of
a constitutional requirement there should be no discrimination
unless it is shown that marriages of males are significantly more
likely to end in divorce than marriages of females of the same
age.
B. IN ii iATE AGE GnoUp
1. The Present Statutory Pattern
Under the Uniform Act a person in the intermediate age
group (16 or 17) may marry if he or she obtains either parental
or judicial consent. In almost all jurisdictions a showing of
parental consent is sufficient for a party in this age group to
marry.54 A typical statute provides that for males between the
50. Monahan, supra note 22, at table 1.
51. Monahan, supra note 22, at table 3. Note that the ratio of
divorces to marriage for ages 16 and under for both males and females
is A5 and at age 17 is .27 for males and .28 for females.
52. Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the
date of ratification.
Proposed Amendment to the United States Constitution, HLR.J. Res.
208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (March 22, 1972).
53. The basic principle of the Equal Rights Amendment is
that sex is not a permissible factor in determining the legal
rights of women, or of men. This means that the treatment of
any person by the law may not be based upon the circumstance
that such person is of one sex or the other. The law does, of
course, impose different benefits or different burdens upon dif-
ferent members of the society. That differentiation in treat-
ment may rest upon particular characteristics or traits of the
persons affected, such as strength, intelligence, and the like.
But under the Equal Rights Amendment the existence of such
a characteristic or trait to a greater degree in one sex does notjustify classification by sex rather than by the particular char-
acteristic or trait.
Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment:
A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871,
889 (1971).
54. AL. CODE tit. 34, § 10 (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.171 (1965);
ARz. REv. STAT. ANw. § 25-122 (1956); Ann. STAT. ArN. § 55-102
(1971); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANn. § 46-5(g) (1958); DEL. CODE ANn. tit.
13, § 123 (1953); D.C. CODE ENCYCL ANN. § 30-111 (1968); FLA. STAT.
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ages of 18 and 21 and females between the ages of 16 and 18,
parental consent is both necessary and sufficient." However, a
number of statutes provide that in the event of pregnancy a judge
may issue a license in the absence of parental consent; 5 only
a few provide that the judge has discretion to override the re-
quirement of parental consent in all cases.57 Thus, except in the
circumstance of pregnancy, parental consent is a necessity in al-
most all jurisdictions for obtaining a license for those in the
intermediate age group.
2. Inadequacies of the Present Statutory Pattern
Present age restrictions impose significant costs by infring-
ing upon individual freedom without achieving an acceptable
ANN. § 741.04 (1964); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-204 (1961), as amended, Ga.
Acts 1972, no. 862; HAwAII REV. LAWS § 572-2 (1968); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 32-202 (1963); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 89, § 3 (Smith-Hurd 1966); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 44-202 (1965); IOWA CODE ANN. § 595.3 (1950), as amended,
Iowa Acts 1972, house file 1011; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-106 (Supp. 1971);
Ky. REV. STAT. § 402.210 (1972); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 97 (West 1952);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 62 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 62 § 9
(1972); MAss. ANN. LAWS Ch. 207, § 7 (1969); MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 551.103 (1967); Mss. CODE ANN. § 461 (1942); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
451.090 (1952); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-105 (1968); NEV. REV. STAT. §
122.020 (1965); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-6 (1968); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 57-1-6 (1962); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 15 (McKinney 1964); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 51-2 (1966); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-02 (1971); OHio REV.
CODE ANN. § 3101.01 (Page 1960); ORE. REV. STAT. § 106.060 (1971);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 1-5 (1965), as amended, Pa. Acts 1972, no. 152;
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-2-11 (1969); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-24 (1962);
TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.51 (1971); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-9 (1969);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5142 (1968); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-48 (1960); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 26.04.210 (1961); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-1-8 (1966);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 245.02 (1957); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 20-3 (1957).
Several jurisdictions also require judicial consent in certain cases:
CAL. CIv. CODE § 4101 (West 1970) (For parties under 18); MiNN.
STAT. § 517.02 (1969) (For females 16 to 18); MONT. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 48-143 (1961) (For parties under 19); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:5
et seq. (1968) (For males under 20 and females under 18).
55. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-122 (1956).
56. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.06 (1964); ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 89, § 3.2
(Smith-Hurd 1966); IOWA CODE ANN. § 595.2 (1950); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 62, § 9(a) (1972) (physician's certificate of pregnancy sufficient);
N.J. STAT. ANN § 37:1-6 (1968); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-1-6 (1962); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 51-2 (1966) (Director of Public Welfare); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 20-24.5 (1962) (when female pregnant, male may marry without his
parents' consent).
57. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-202 (1965) (judge may waive
the age requirements where there are "good and sufficient reasons shown
and it is in the best interests of the parties"); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 15-2-11 (1969) (the director of public welfare's consent is a substitute
for parental consent). These powers are probably exercised only in
the case of pregnancy.
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level of stability.58 Some of the failure may be due to lack of
enforcement and uniformity, but the chief reason is probably
the use of parental consent as the mechanism to deter youthful
marriage and to provide a more mature evaluation of a proposed
marriage. Parental consent is inadequate for several reasons.
First, obtaining parental consent is preventive rather than
preparative. Even if the parents consent only after careful con-
sideration of their child's capacities and potential problems, the
risks of early marriage will not disappear since the problem
of immaturity in coping with problems after marriage remains.
A system relying solely on the selective approval of youthful
marriages will therefore not minimize the problem of immatur-
ity. A better approach requires some form of premarital edu-
cation that will prepare young people for the difficulties of an
early marriage.5 9
Second, parental consent may be a mere formality. While
many parents who are asked to consent consider the factors as-
sociated with the risk of divorce in teenage marriage such as
inadequate future income and living accommodations, there is no
guarantee that they will do so; and despite a conclusion that
the marriage will not succeed, parents may be easily convinced
to consent.60 For example, after South Carolina (marriageable
age 18) began requiring proof of age by birth certificate for 18,
19 and 20 year olds the number of marriages with parental con-
sent increased. This led one investigator to conclude that
"[t]here is .. .no evidence from the . . . data to support the
hypothesis that the requirement of parental consent is a deter-
rent to early marriage."' Further, Minnesota juvenile court
judges report that parents are "willing to lie as to their daugh-
58. See, e.g., Monahan supra note 22.
59. For example, premarital counseling, which has been used in
California and Iowa. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4101 (West Supp. 1971) provides
that a license will not be issued to one under 18 unless he "par-
ticipate[s] in premarital counseling concerning social, economic, and
personal responsibilities incident to marriage ... ." See Adams, Mar-
riage of Minors: Unsuccessful Attempt to Help Them, 3 FA. L.Q. 13
(1969),. for an account of the Iowa experience. Another premarital
training device is family life education conducted in primary and sec-
ondary schools.
60. R. LEVY, supra note 15, at 21-22: "What little evidence there
is suggests that parents cannot be relied on to achieve state regulatory
objectives .... " See also Burchinal, Research on Young Marriage:
Implications for Family Life Education, 9 FAALInY LIrs COORDINATOR 6,
17 (1960), ("most parents are not able or willing to provide their chil-
dren with adequate preparation.. . ."); Rosenwaike, supra note 32.
61. Gover & Jones, supra note 33.
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ter's pregnancy in order to obtain the required judicial author-
ization. 62
A third weakness of the present system is that the purpose
of the parental consent requirement may be to preserve parental
authority rather than to achieve stability in teenage marriage.
Some cases suggest that parental consent is a prerogative for
the parents rather than a safeguard for the child.0 3 Although
it is arguably inconsistent to impose on parents the responsibil-
ity for the well-being and training of children without granting
the legal right to control, the preservation of the right to forbid
marriage comes only at the expense of limiting individual choice
and possibly preventing many marriages which could have suc-
ceeded. Thus the potential costs of requiring parental consent,
such as forcing young people into an illicit relationship, justify
review of the parental decision.
Conversely, the parental right to allow a child to marry is
not justified if it conflicts with the goal of preventing divorce-
prone marriage. Even assuming that parents are in the best
position to determine whether their child has the ability to ac-
cept the responsibilities of marriage, it is doubtful that many
parents, who are frequently emotionally involved, rationally eval-
uate the prospects for success. Review of the parental decision
to consent by some outside authority is probably necessary for
rational evaluation.
A fourth weakness is that the parental consent system ig-
nores many factors in addition to age and immaturity such as
large expenses, early pregnancy, the sudden need to drop out
of school and emotional disturbance that cause youthful mar-
riages to fail. Virtually all youthful marriages are subject to
these risks, and to expect parents to evaluate the likelihood of
success with any certainty is impossible. Perhaps a more ra-
tional marital age regulation system should attempt to discour-
age youthful marriage in general yet aid those youthful mar-
riages that are allowed. Continued marital counseling after
marriage and financial and educational aid are possible solutions
62. R. LEVY, supra note 15, at 22.
63. In Lyndon v. Lyndon, 69 Ill. 43, 44 (1873), the Illinois Supreme
Court stated that children "are in a state of servitude to their parents,
from which they cannot be released except by the consent of the par-
ents." And a California court in Turner v. Turner, 167 Cal. App. 2d
636, 642, 334 P.2d 1011, 1015 (1959), stated that the "purpose of a
statute providing that a marriage license shall not be issued to a person
under age without the consent of a parent is to permit the parent to
exercise control and discipline over a child. .. ."
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that could be coupled with the requirement of consent. Such a
program is of course subject to the criticism that in aiding youth-
ful marriages it is an incentive to marry young. In any event,
reliance should be shifted from parental consent. It provides
no real deterrent and does not guarantee a meaningful eval-
uation of a proposed marriage. The important question is wheth-
er a different system could achieve these goals and wheth-
er that achievement would reduce the risk in teenage mar-
riage sufficiently to justify invasion of individual liberty to
marry. Any alternative should provide for review of parental
decisions and emphasize preparation and aid for those marriages
that are allowed.
3. The Uniform Act
The Uniform Act follows the majority of states in providing
that parental consent alone is sufficient for marriage between
the age of capacity and marriageable age. The Act is subject to
the same criticisms as the state statutes in this respect. How-
ever, the Act is innovative in providing that no paramount right
is vested in parents to decide when their child may not marry.
The comment to Section 205 states that "applicants cannot be de-
nied judicial approval solely because a parent or parents have
refused to consent to the marriage .... ." To grant consent in
the absence of parental consent the judge must find that mar-
riage is in the best interests of the applicant and that the appli-
cant is capable of assuming the responsibilities of marriage.0 4
Removed from the emotions of the family, judicial consideration
hopefully provides a more rational evaluation of the marriage's
chance of success. A judge well versed in the sociological data
will be more likely to consider the factors associated with suc-
cess and failure.
There are several criticisms of this extension of judicial
power. First, it can be argued the power to override a parental
veto harms family life. It is true that parental consent is an
important part of a strong family unit and that respect for par-
ental decisions may decline when society provides an alternative.
However, judicial consent in the case of parental disapproval is
not likely to issue under the Uniform Act unless there is abuse
of parental control, 65 in which case review is justified. In addi-
64. UNiFoRmvAcT § 205 (1970).
65. Undoubtedly a judge will consider that parents are generally in
the best position to know whether their child is capable of assuming
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tion, where parental abuse exists the family unit is probably not
stable at the outset.
A second possible criticism of the judicial consent provision
is that it fails to provide a standard for judicial consent. The
judge is to consider the "best interests" of the applicant, the
ability to assume "the responsibilities of marriage," and must
also consider that "[p]regnancy alone does not establish that
the best interests of the party would be served."0 0 It would be
better to consider all the factors associated with failure in youth-
ful marriages, because such would reduce the chance of ar-
bitrary treatment. However, no standard incorporating a mech-
anical formula is possible due to the lack of agreement of the
value to be assigned each factor.
It might be argued that a forum other than a court might
be better equipped to apply the necessarily vague standard.0
Social service organizations have better investigative procedures
and would be more cognizant of the predictive sociological data,
particularly if the judge deals with family law only infrequently.
If there is to be a review of the parental decision not to consent,
that review should be the most rational one available; even
though the Uniform Act is correct in the choice of a standard,
it is perhaps wrong in its choice of the reviewer.
A third possible criticism of the extension of judicial review
is that it may produce a large caseload, since young people wish-
ing to marry may seek judicial consent whenever their parents
refuse. However, as already noted, judges will likely override
the parental refusal to consent only where there is clear parental
abuse and the number of such occasions will probably be small.
Once these limits are established recourse to the court should
quickly diminish.
The provision for judicial consent, then, represents an im-
provement because it demands a realistic evaluation of the
chance of success for a proposed marriage where parents refuse
the obligations of marriage and that the lack of parental support may
lessen the chances for success of the marriage. Some sociologists do
identify the lack of parental support as a factor associated with the
risk of divorce in teenage marriage. Burchinal, supra note 24, at 7;
Winch & Greer, The Uncertain Relation Between Early Marriage and
Marital Stability: A Quest for Relevant Data, 8 ACTA SOCIOLOICA 83,
92-95 (1965).
66. See note 64 supra.
67. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 15-2-11 (1969). An investi-
gation by the Welfare Department for those under 16 wishing to marry
is required.
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to consent. However, there is no provision under the Act for
judicial review of an irrational parental decision to allow the
child to marry. Since there is evidence that parental consent
is often a mere formality, judicial review should be extended to
those cases where the parents consent. The parties would then
have to prove they are capable of assuming the responsibilities
of marriage, and would be forced to think more carefully about
an early marriage. Since prediction of a marriage's chance of
success is probably more accurate if based on sociological data, a
judge, who is more likely to have access to that data, should pro-
vide a better selective procedure.
Further, judicial review of parental consent represents no
greater invasion of family autonomy than review of the parental
refusal to consent, which the Uniform Act incorporates. Extend-
ing judicial review to those cases where the parents do con-
sent, however, presents the danger of misuse of judicial dis-
cretion. The decision might often be based upon arbitrary
standards due to the imprecision of sociological data; in many
cases the judge may be in no better position than the par-
ents to make the decision. In addition, there is no agreement
as to the essential elements of a successful marriage, nor can
the problems a teenage marriage will face be accurately pre-
dicted. Perhaps for these reasons the authors of the Uniform
Act considered arbitrary judicial treatment a major problem in
family law68 and were therefore concerned about the extension of
judicial review. However, judicial review is no more arbitrary
than parental consent, and it has the advantage of being more
than a mere formality. Moreover, the danger of judicial arbi-
trariness in reviewing the parental decision to consent is no
greater in any given case than that present in reviewing parental
refusal, which the Act incorporates.
C. UNDER =a AmE oF CAPAcITY
The Uniform Act requires both parental and judicial consent
for marriage under the age of 16. There are presently three
major categories of statutes regulating such marriages. 0 The
68. In the absence of reliable information suggesting that thejudicial task has been well performed in the past, I would
prefer to limit the discretion exercised by individual judges.
Levy, Report to Members of the Special Committee on Uniform Di-
vorce and Marriage Laws 23 (July 10, 1967).
69. Some states have a statutory pattern for marriage under the
age of capacity that fits into more than one category. E.g., HAvAn Rav.
LAws § 572-1 (1968) (males under 17 and females under 15 may never
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first prohibits marriage below the age of capacity.7 0 The second
allows marriage only where the girl is pregnant or has given
birth.71 A few of these statutes allow marriage if there is par-
ental consent,7 2 while others require both parental and judicial
consent.7 3 The third category allows marriage without regard to
pregnancy when both parental and judicial consent is obtained.7 4
marry). Above those ages, but beneath 18 for males and 16 for fe-
males, both parental and judicial consent is required. Beneath 18 and
16 (the ages of capacity), then, there are two sets of regulations in
some states.
70. Ai-A. CODE tit. 34, § 4 (1958) (17 for males, 14 for females);
D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 30-103 (1968) (18 for males, 16 for females);
GA. CODE ANN. § 53-102 (1961) (17 for males, 14 for females);
HAwAII REV. LAws § 572-1 (1968) (17 for males, 15 for females); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 89, § 3.1 (Smith-Hurd 1966) (16 for males, 15 for fe-
males); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 207, § 9 (1969) (14 for males, 12
for females); MINN. STAT. § 517.03 (1969) (18 for males, 16 for fe-
males); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-102 (1968) (18 for males, 16 for females);
N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 15-a (McKinney 1964) (16 for males, 14 for fe-
males); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-02 (18 for males, 15 for females);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 106.010 (1971) (18 for males, 15 for females); TEx.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.51 (1971) (16 for males, 14 for females); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 30-1-2 (1969) (16 for males, 14 for females); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 245.02 (1957) (18 for males, 16 for females); Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§ 20-2 (1957) (16 for males, 15 for females) (in effect only if the voters
approve in November 1972 a constitutional amendment lowering the
voting age to 18).
71. ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.171 (1965); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-
102 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 55-102 (1971); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§ 123(f) (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.06 (1964); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-
206 (1961), as amended, Ga. Acts 1972, no. 862; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 89,
§ 3.2 (Smith-Hurd 1966); IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-101 (1965); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 595.2 (1950); Ky. REv. STAT. § 402.020 (1972); MIcH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 551.201 (1967); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-1-6 (1962); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 51-2 (1966); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.04 (Page 1960); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 20.24.5 (1962); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 25-1-12 (1967); VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-48 (1960); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-1-1 (1966).
In only one state has there been a statutory movement away from
leniency in the case of pregnancy. Nebraska in 1971 removed all
mention of pregnancy from its statute. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-102 (1968).
72. Alaska, Georgia, South Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia. See
note 71 supra.
73. Arizona, Arkansas, Michigan, Ohio, West Virginia. See note 71
supra.
74. CAL. Civ. CODE § 4101 (West 1970); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 46-5f, g (1958); HAwAn REV. LAWS § 572-1 (1968) (approval of family
court); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-202 (1963); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-106
(Supp. 1971); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 92 (West 1952); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 19, § 62 (1964); MASS. ANN. LAWS Ch. 207, § 25 (1969); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 461 (1942); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 451.090 (1952); MONT. REV.
CODE ANN. § 48-143 (1961); Nzv. REV. STAT. § 122.025 (1965); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 457:6-7 (1968); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 15 (McKinney 1964);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 1-5 (1964), as amended, Pa. Acts 1972, no. 152;
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-2-11 (1969); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5142
(1968).
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The predominant pattern, then, is to require both parental and
judicial consent either with or without the additional factor of
pregnancy. The standards of such judicial consent are vague
and are most often phrased in terms of the "best interests of the
public" 75 or "good cause."'7  The purpose of the pregnancy stat-
utes is to remove the stigma of unwed motherhood and illegiti-
macy,77 though there is some suggestion that the latter is the
predominant concern.78
The Uniform Act requires both the parents and a judge to
consent to a marriage under the age of 16. Since the sociological
data reveals that marriages where one of the parties is under 16
are the most divorce prone,79 effective control is most important
in this age group. The answer is clearly not to prohibit all
marriage below the age of capacity, since such an arbitrary
regulation only encourages parties denied legal sanction to form
illicit relationships. An appropriate regulation in this area
would be one which would be highly selective in allowing such
marriages. It has already been suggested that parental consent
represents a mere formality in many cases. However, under the
Uniform Act knowledge that a judge must also grant permission
may deter children from deciding to marry and will also ensure
that there is a less emotional consideration of the chance of suc-
cess of a marriage.8 0
The Uniform Act also provides that pregnancy itself does
not establish that the best interests of the party would be served
by allowing the marriage. Sociologists report that "[d]ispro-
portionately high divorce rates are found to be associated with
the condition of premarital pregnancy .... ."81 In fact, no other
factor has been so frequently identified with the risk of di-
vorce.8 2 Perhaps pregnancy should be a reason for not allowing
the marriage rather than a basis for approval, and in any event,
75. E.g., My. REv. STAT. ANx. tit. 19, § 62 (1964).
76. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-409 (1955).
77. See, e.g., OsiO REv. CODE ANN. § 3101.04 (Page 1960).
78. Id. (legislative comment).
79. See note 22 supra.
80. As noted in note 67 supra, a social service organization
would be better suited to make this evaluation because of better social
science training and investigative capacity.
81. Christiensen & Meissner, Studies in Child Spacing: ll-Premar-
ital Pregnancy as a Factor In Divorce, 18 Amm SOCrAL Rzv. 641, 642
(1953).
82. Gallaher & Levy, Youth Marriage: Summary and Critique of
the Data and Literature, appearing in, R. LEvy, UNIFORM MAURAG. AND
DIVORcE Ls fxsLAniox: A PRiE.nVNARY ANALYSIS, Appendix C, at C-47.
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a greater showing of the advisability of marriage should be re-
quired where the female is pregnant. The marital age regula-
tions should not be used to further a policy of legitimating chil-
dren, especially when the child is unlikely to be better off in the
unhappy or broken home that may result from a marriage ne-
cessitated by pregnancy.
D. WAITING PERIOD, EVIDENTIARY REQUIREMENTS, COUNSELING
Several provisions of the Uniform Act apply to all mar-
riages. The Act provides that a license will not issue until three
days after application is made.8 3 It further provides that satis-
factory proof of age and parental consent8 4 must be given be-
fore a license will issue. Although an earlier draft provided
that applicants be given a printed statement advising counsel-
ing, 5 the present Act makes no mention of premarital counsel-
ing.
1. Three Day Waiting Period
Most states presently have either a three or five day waiting
period,8 6 apparently to avoid spur-of-the-moment marriages. 87
83. A license to marry becomes effective throughout this state
3 days after the date of the issuance and expires 180 days after
it becomes effective, unless the [ ] court orders that the li-
cense is effective when issued.
UNIFORM ACT § 204.
84. Parental consent, of course, applies only to those under "mar-
riageable age."
85. First Tentative Draft (New Orleans).
86. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.091 (1965); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 55-205 (1971); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46-5d (1958); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 13, § 107 (1953); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 30-109 (1968);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.04 (1964); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-202 (1961), as
amended, Ga. Acts 1972, no. 862; IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 32-202, 403 (1963);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-201 (1965); IOWA CODE ANN. § 595.4 (1950); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 23-106 (Supp. 1971); KY. REv. STAT. § 402.080 (1972); LA.
Civ. CODE ANN. art. 99 (West 1952); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 61
(1964); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 207, § 19 (1969); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.
§ 551.103a (1967); MINN. STAT. § 517.08 (1969); Miss. CODE ANN. § 461
(1942); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 451.040 (1952); MONT. REv. CODE ANN. § 48-118.1
(1961); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42.104 (1968); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 457:26
(1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-4 (1968); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-1-11.1
(1962); Omo Rsv. CODE ANN. § 3101.05 (Page 1960); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 36-406 (1955); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5145 (1968); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.04.160 (1961); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-1-6 (1966); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 245.08 (1957).
87. E.g., Proposed Marriage and Divorce Codes for Pennsylvania,
Pennsylvania General Assembly, Joint State Government Commission,
1961, § 207 comment (c).
[Vol. 57:179
UNIFORM MARRIAGE ACT
Some have advocated a longer waiting period, such as 30 days,88
arguing that easy marriage breeds easy divorce8" and therefore
anything which impedes easy marriage is beneficial 9 0
A longer period does provide more time for the parties to
contemplate their decision and perhaps change their minds; how-
ever, where the decision has already been made and any required
consent obtained, it is unlikely that a 30 day wait will be a further
deterrent.91 The Uniform Act's choice of a short waiting period
rather than a long one thus appears correct; it is consistent with
the Act's approach of streamlining premarital regulations which
have no useful effect.
2. Evidentiary Requirements
All states require some indication that an applicant has
reached the age at which parental consent is no longer required.
While an oath is almost always required,9 2 some states also pro-
vide that the licensing officer may require proof of age.03 A dis-
tinct minority require proof-generally a birth certificate-in ev-
ery case.94 In most states, therefore, a mature-appearing under-
age party may successfully lie about his age.
88. Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce, Report 1951-1955,
Cmd. No. 9678, Minutes of Evidence at 308 (1956).
89. See, e.g., note 87 supra.
90. Furlong, Youthful Marriage and Parenthood: A Threat to Fam-
ily Stability, 19 HAsmNGs L.J. 105, 128 (1967).
91. The comment to U NFoam ACT § 204 indicates that longer wait-
ing periods do not discourage potentially unstable marriages, but this
ineffectiveness may result from provisions allowing the judge to waive
the waiting period.
92. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.091 (1965); Amz Rnv. STAT.
ANN. § 25-121 (1956); CONN. GENa. STAT. ANN. § 46-5a (1958); DEr.
CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 120 (1953); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 30-110
(1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.04 (1964); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-202
(1961), as amended, Ga. Acts 1972, no. 862; HAwAiI REV. LAws § 572-6
(1968); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 89, § 6 (Smith-Hurd 1966); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 23-106 (Supp. 1971); M. ANN. CODE: art. 62, § 6 (1972); MAss. ANN.
LAws ch. 207, § 20 (1969); MIss. CODE ANN. § 461 (1942); Nsv. Rsv. STAT.
§ 122.040 (1965); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-8 (1968); Omo Rnv. CODE ANN.
§ 3101.05 (Page 1960); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 15-2-7 (1969); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 5131 (1968); VAL CODE ANN. § 20-16 (1960); WA.sm REv.
CODE ANN. § 26.04A60 (1961); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-1-8 (1966).
93. ALA. CODE tit. 34, § 16 (1948); CAL. CIV. CODE § 4201 (West
1970); HAwAu REv. LAws § 572-6 (1968); MASS. ANN. LAWS Ch. 207,
§ 33A (1969); M1cE. Cowm. LAws ANN. § 551.103 (1967); N.C. GEN.
SmT. § 51-8 (1966).
94. GA. CODE ANN. § 53-206 (1961), as amended, Ga. Acts 1972, no.
862; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-202 (1963); IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-202 (1965);
IowA CODE ANN. § 595.4 (1950); LU. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 98 (West 1952);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 461 (1942); MONT. REv. CODE ANN. § 48-134 (1961);
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Many states require proof of parental consent in writing be-
fore an officer or a notary.9 5 Some require only that parental
consent be in writing,96 while others require that the parents per-
sonally appear before the licensing officer.97  Virtually all states
provide sanctions for false statements to the licensing officer;98
and licensing officers and judges that issue licenses in violation of
the age provisions are subject to more severe penalties.9 9 These
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-8 (1968); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-1-10 (1962); N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 15 (McKinney 1964); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-17
(1971); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-2-11 (1969); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20.24.1,
2 (1962); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-1-6; WIs. STAT. ANN. § 245.09 (1957);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 20-5 (1957).
95. ALA. CODE tit. 34, § 10 (1958); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46-5g
(1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 123 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.04
(1964); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-204 (1961), as amended, Ga. Acts 1972, no.
862; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-202 (1963); IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-202 (1965);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-106 (Supp. 1971); Ky. REv. STAT. § 402.210 (1972);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 62 (1964); MICH. COMP. LAW ANN. § 551.103
(1967); MINN. STAT. § 517.08 (1969); MIss. CODE ANN. § 461 (1942); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 451.090 (1952); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 48-143(a) (1961);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-105 (1968); NEV. REV. STAT. § 122.025 (1965); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 57-1-5 (1962); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 15 (McKinney 1964);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-03-17 (1971); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-9 (1969);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.04.160 (1961); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-1-8
(1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 245.02 (1957).
96. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-122, 128 (1956); CAL. CIV. CODE§ 4101 (West 1970); HAwAI REV. LAWS § 572-2 (1968); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 207 § 33 (1969); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:6 (1968); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 51-2 (1966); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5142 (1968).
97. GA. CODE ANN. § 53-204 (1961), as amended, Ga. Acts 1972, no.
862; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 89, § 3 (Smith-Hurd 1966); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19, § 62 (1964); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.52 (1971). Apparently a
parent must be present at the solemnization in New York. N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW § 11a (McKinney 1964).
98. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.341 (1965); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§ 127 (1953); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 30-110 (1968); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 89, § 6 (Smith-Hurd 1966); IND. ANN. STAT. § 44-210 (1965);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 595.8 (1950); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 100
(1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 62, § 11 (1972); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
207, § 52 (1969); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 551.108 (1967); MONT.
REV. CODE ANN. § 48-130.2 (1961); NEV. REV. STAT. § 122.200 (1965);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 457:9 (1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-8 (1968);
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 16 (McKinney 1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-15
(1966); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-28 (1971); Omo REV. CODE ANN. §
3101.99 (Page 1960); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-24.3 (1962); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 30-1-10 (1969); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5140 (1968); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.04.210 (1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 245.30 (1957).
99. ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.331 (1965), for example, provides for ei-
ther $500 fine or 6 month imprisonment. See also ALA. CODE tit. 34, § 5
(1958); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-128 (1956); ARx. STAT. ANN. § 55-
214 (1971); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46-51 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 13, § 112 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.05 (1964); GA. CODE ANN.§ 53-208 (1961), as amended, Ga. Acts 1972, no. 862; IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 32-403 (1963); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 89, § 13 (Smith-Hurd 1966); IND.
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penalties are not effective, because it is difficult to prove that
an officer or judge has knowingly violated the provisions,10 0 and
the sanctions are often not enforced.' 0 ' A few states require a
bond which is forfeited if the parties have violated the age re-
strictions. 0 2
The Uniform Act requires only "satisfactory proof" of age
and parental consent. The draftsmen apparently felt that the
Act should indicate that proof was essential, but that the choice
of the type of proof was for the individual state. 0 3 The ap-
proach may also be due to a belief that enforcement depends
less on the standard of proof than on the attitude of the licens-
ing officer. 0 4 It is submitted, however, that the approach of the
Uniform Act is inadequate. There are indications that the wide
discretion afforded licensing officers is responsible for abuse and
ANN. STAT. § 44-202 (1965); IOWA CODE ANN. § 595.9 (1950); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 23-111 (1963); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 92 (West 1952); ME REv.
STAT. AN. tit. 19, § 62 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 62, § 11 (1972); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 207, § 51 (1969); MIcH. CorAP. LAws ANN. § 551.14 (1967);
MiN. STAT. § 517.14 (1969); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 451.120 (1952); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 42-113 (1968); NEV. REV. STAT. § 122.210 (1965); N.H. Rrv. STAT.
ANx. §§ 457:9, 35 (1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-11 (1968); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 57-1-10 (1962); N.Y. Do. REL. LAW §§ 15, 15a (McKinney 1964);
ND. CENT. CODE § 14-03-28 (1971); OMO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.99 (Page
1960); R.L GEN. LAws ANN. § 15-3-10 (1969); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-
24.4 (1962); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-413 (1955); TEX FAm CODE ANN.
§ 1.09 (1971); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 30-1-15, 16 (1969); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, §§ 5141, 5143 (1968); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-33 (1960); WAsH. Rnv.
CODE ANN. § 26.04.230 (1961); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-1-20 (1966);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 245.30 (1957); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 20-15 (1957).
100. For example, the Alaska Statute provides a penalty only if
the officer "knowingly" performs a marriage in violation of the statutes.
ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.341 (1965).
101. High rates of teenage marriage found in some Tennessee
counties were attributed to lax enforcement of the marital regulations.
There are many 'marriage mills" or areas where either easily evadable
laws or purposefully lax enforcement encourages migration of teen-
agers from other states. Rosenwaike, Parental Consent Ages as a
Factor in State Variation in Bride's Age at Marriage, 29 J. MAMn. FA .
452, 453 (1967). See C. FOOTE, R. LsVv & F. SANDER, CAsES AND MA-
TERIALs ON FAMILY LAw 238 (1966) for a discussion of marriage mills.
102. ARx. STAT. ANN. § 55-213 (1971); KY. REv. STAT. § 402.210
(1972).
103. The Act assumes that each state will adapt its existing
marriage licensing statute so that it conforms to the substan-
tive regulatory provisions of the Act. Such statutes vary sub-
stantially from state to state; and there is no special interest in
obtaining uniformity as to the form utilized for marriage li-
censes and registrations.
UNiro~mu AcT § 202, comment.
104. It may be that the economic return of "marriage mills" is
such that they will occur regardless of strict proof requirements. See
note 101, supra.
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migratory marriage. 10 To remedy this problem, discretion in
licensing officers should be limited by specifying the type of
proof of age or consent required, and severe sanctions should be
imposed upon licensing officers who willfully evade the statute.
Requiring specific proof, such as a birth certificate or social
security card, and requiring parents to appear before the licens-
ing officer, are not heavy burdens for the applicant. If there is
to be a serious attempt to supervise youthful marriage, it should
not be easy to evade age restrictions.
3. Premarital Counseling
California requires premarital counseling prior to the issu-
ance of a marriage license,10 6 and other states have enabling
statutes through which such a prerequisite could be estab-
lished.1 0 7 Counseling would apprise the parties of the problems
they face, including the risk of failure of the marriage, and sug-
gest solutions to these problems.10 8 In appropriate cases mar-
riage would be discouraged. It is submitted that preparative
counseling should be an important component of any marriage
regulation system. However, all experiences with counseling
have not been successful.10 9 The major criticism of counseling
is that it only reaches the parties after they have made the de-
cision to marry"0 when there is little chance of deterrence and
too little time to prepare the parties for marriage."' Further-
more, those involved place little value on the counseling-e.g.,
a study in Iowa concluded that counseling arouses guilt, anger
and hostility. 1 2 Finally, the number of parties dissuaded from
marriage by premarital counseling apparently is not large.113
Success in preparation for marriage is most likely to come
from areas other than the law. Many sociologists have thought
that family life education is more effective than counseling in
105. Rosenwaike, supra note 101.
106. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4101 (West 1970).
107. See Weiss & Collada, Judicial Consent to Marry-Its Com-
plex Demands, 3 FAM. L.Q. 288, 290 (1969). See Adams, Marriage of
Minors: Unsucessful Attempt to Help Them, 3 FAm. L.Q. 13 (1969).
108. Adams, supra note 107, at 14.
109. Adams, supra note 107, at 13. "[A study] showed that nearly
all minors and parents felt that they were not being helped, while the
... family service agency was ... damaged ......
110. Id. at 20.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 17-20.
113. Id. at 15 ("all but one of the [28] marriages were sanctioned
by the court").
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reducing the number of early marriages because it teaches the
risks of early marriage before people have decided to marry.1 1 4
In addition, proper preparation for marriage appears more likely
as the period of preparation and training is lengthened.
The failure of the Uniform Act to provide for any counsel-
ing may reflect the view that counseling is ineffective and that
family life education is a better method of preparation and de-
terence. It is unfortunate, however, that the Act does not ex-
press support for programs of preparation nor dissatisfaction
with a system that only focuses on the decision to marry.
E. AN!uIimT As ENFORCEMNT
Finally, the Act provides for annulment as a tool for en-
forcing the age and consent restrictions. Under the Act both the
parties and the parents have the right to sue for the annulment
of a marriage which violates both age and consent restrictions.
A suit for annulment must be brought before the underage party
reaches the age at which he could marry without the omitted
requirement.115
Several state statutes treat marriages contracted by par-
ties under a prescribed age as void or of no legal effect;1 1 6 how-
ever, most states treat marriages under the age of capacity only as
voidable; of legal effect until judicial decree of annulment, either
by common law n17 or by statute.1 8 A number of statutes provide
114. There seems to be fairly general agreement that many of
the causes of marital instability, especially among young
spouses, may be ameliorated by a broad program of family life
education in the public schools.
R. LEVY, supra note 15, at 31. Furlong, Youthful Marriage and Parent-
hood: A Threat to Family Stability, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 105, 117 (1967)
("greatest hope lies in prevention through a program of education").
115. No suit is permitted after the death of one of the parties.
UNIFORm ACT § 208.
116. Ky. REv. STAT. § 402.020 (1972) (marriage of male under 18,
female 16 void); MAss. GEN. Laws ANN. ch. 207, § 9 (1968) (marriage
of male under 14, female 12 void); McH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 552.2
(1967) (marriage contracted under age of consent void); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 30-1-2 (1969) (marriage of male under 16 or female under 14
void); Wis. STAT. AN. § 245.21 (1957).
117. E.g., Luke v. Hill, 137 Ga. 159, 73 S.E. 345 (1911). See also
R. Kingsley, The Law of Infants' Marriages, 9 VND. L. REv. 593, 597
(1956).
118. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 25.05.031 (1965); ARm STAT. ANN.
§§ 55-102, 106 (1971); D.C. CODE ENCYcL. ANN. § 30-103 (1968); IND.
ANN. STAT. § 44-106 (1965); MNN. STAT. § 518.02 (1969); NE. REv.
STAT. § 42-118 (1968); NEv. REv. STAr. § 125.310 (1965); N.J. STAT.
ANwN. § 2A:34-1 (1952); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 7 (McKinney 1964);
OHo REv. CODE ANN. § 3105.31 (Page 1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 512
1972]
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that parents may sue for annulment, 119 and a few provide
that the underage party's "next friend" can sue.120  In the ab-
sence of such provisions, common law prevails. 1 2 1 At common
law the marriage of a party under the age of seven was void, 22
and the marriage of a female between the age seven and 12 or
a male between seven and 14 was voidable. While a void mar-
riage was subject to suit by any interested party at any time,
a voidable marriage was subject to attack only by one of the par-
ties to the marriage. Parents, therefore, were generally not al-
lowed to sue for annulment where their child was over seven
years of age at the time of his marriage. 2
In most jurisdictions a marriage above the age of capacity
without the required parental consent is valid and may not be
annulled. 24  In those states providing for annulment of mar-
riages which did not receive necessary parental consent, such
marriages are treated as voidable, and under most statutes par-
ents are allowed to sue only until the child reaches marriageable
age.' 2
5
(1958); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-1 (1966); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 20-33
(1957).
119. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 55-102 (1971); CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 4426 (West 1970); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 30-104 (1968);
HAWAiI REv. LAWS § 580-22 (1968); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-501 (1963);
MONT. REv. CODE ANN. § 48-203 (1961); Nebraska Laws 1972, leg. bill 1086,
§ 29; NEv. REv. STAT. § 125.320 (1965); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 457:5
(1968); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-1-9 (1962); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 140
(McKinney 1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-2 (1966); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-04-01 (1971); OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3105.32 (Page 1960); TEx.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.41 (1971); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 513 (1958);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 247.02 (1957); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 20-35 (1957). In
some jurisdictions, if in the best interests of the parties, the court has
authority to refuse an annulment sought by the parents. D.C. CODE
ENCYCL. ANN. § 16-903 (1966); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 48-202 (1961);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:5-5a (1968); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-407
(1955); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.41 (1971); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 7
(McKinney 1964); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-17.3 (1969).
120. See GA. CODE ANN. § 53-603 (1961); Ky. REV. STAT. § 402.030
(1972).
121. Niland v. Niland, 96 N.J. Eq. 438, 126 A. 530 (1924); Fink v.
Fink, 70 S.D. 366, 17 N.W.2d 717 (1945); Kirby v. Gilliam, 182 Va. 111,
28 S.E.2d 40 (1943); Ex parte Hollopeter, 52 Wash. 41, 100 P. 159 (1909).
122. 1 BLACKSTONE, COm!VnENTAIEs 436 (1807).
123. Id. Where marriage was contracted over the age of seven, a
participant could only bring suit for annulment before the death of
his partner.
124. See, e.g., Robertson v. Robertson, 262 Ala. 114, 77 So. 2d 373
(1955); Johnson v. Alexander, 39 Cal. App. 177, 178 P. 297 (1918);
People ex rel. Mitts v. Ham, 206 Ill. App. 543 (1917); Noble v. Noble,
299 Mich. 565, 200 N.W. 885 (1941); Berry v. Winistorfer, 55 N.D. 310,
213 N.W. 26 (1927).
125. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 55-102 (1971); CAL. CIV. CODE
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The Uniform Act has a single provision governing annul-
ment of marriages under age of capacity and marriages with-
out the required parental consent.126 It conforms to the general
rule which treats underage marriages as voidable only, but it
alters the statutory pattern of treating the parental consent re-
quirement as directory only.
The annulment procedure of the Act has several weaknesses.
First, divorce may be preferable 127 to annulment in that it avoids
the sometimes severe economic consequences of annulment. An
annulled marriage is now considered void from its inception, so
no alimony is allowed and issue may be illegitimate.12 8 By allow-
ing the judge discretion to treat the annulment as a divorce, the
Uniform Act makes a significant change in that a judge can
award alimony and make a property distribution even though the
marriage is deemed null and void.12 9 The Act notes that annul-
ment is a sham proceeding' 30 and a handy substitute for divorce.
The grounds for annulment, such as fraud in inducing marriage
and duress, are probably seldom the real reasons for annulment;
in most cases the marriage has failed for the usual reasons of in-
compatibility. There is therefore no persuasive reason why
such marriages should be dissolved differently than marriages
not subject to annulment.
Although annulment was retained in the Act due to the
need to achieve substantial acceptance, it is unfortunate that a
judge will still have discretion to deny alimony simply because
the marriage is subject to annulment. In underage marriages,
however, several factors mitigate the undesirable effects of an-
nulment. Since an underage marriage is subject to annulment
for at most only a few years after the marriage, and since the
parties are at an age where remarriage and employment oppor-
tunities are available, denial of alimony by annulment in most
cases will not work a hardship. In addition, the use of annulment
may be necessary to provide a method of dissolution by the par-
§§ 4425, 4426 (West 1970); IDAno CODE ANN. § 32-501 (1963); MONT. Rsv.
CODE ANN. §§ 48-202, 203 (1947); NEv. REV. STAT. § 125.320 (1965); N.C.
GEN. ST-T. § 51-2 (1966); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-04-01, 02 (1971);
TEX. FAA.L CODE ANN. § 2.41 (1971); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 247.02 (1957).
126. U1-onm ACT§ 208 (1970).
127. A divorce is awarded under present law for defects occurring
after the marriage, an annulment where there is a defect existing at the
inception of the marriage.
128. However, most states have enacted statutes legitimating such
offspring.
129. U~womv AcT § 208 (1970).
130. UmFo'm AcT Prefatory Note.
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ents since only the parties to a marriage are allowed to obtain a
divorce.
Second, the provision for parental dissolution has some short-
comings. The right of parents to sue for annulment is ap-
parently designed to achieve two goals. First, it deters cou-
ples from evading age restrictions by the threat of effective par-
ental intercession. Second, it may be in the child's best inter-
ests for parents to have the right to dissolve his or her mar-
riage where it has little chance of success. Theoretically both
goals promote the primary goal of stability; yet, since the mar-
riage has in fact occurred, allowing parents to dissolve the mar-
riage in a sense brings about the evil sought to be prevented:
the breakup of youthful marriages. Furthermore, where par-
ents legally dissolve a marriage, there is no assurance that the
parties will not continue the relationship extralegally. Finally,
under the Act, the judge may not refuse to annul the marriage
even if such a refusal appears to be in the best interests of the
marriage partners. This is an undesirable procedure since a
long, stable relationship may be involved.' 3 ' As there should be
review of the parental decision to consent or not to consent to a
marriage, so should there be review of the parental decision to
dissolve a marriage.
The second weakness of the annulment procedure is that a
suit for annulment may be instituted too long after the mar-
riage. An earlier draft limited suits to 90 days after the mar-
riage.132 Obviously, the longer suit is delayed the greater is the
chance of birth of children. Also, allowing the couple to de-
velop a relationship and then permitting someone else to destroy
it is not consistent with a goal of marital stability. Finally, al-
lowing annulment until the underage party reaches marriage-
able age is not likely to present any greater deterrent to evasion
of the marriage regulations than suits restricted to 90 days of
the marriage. It is suggested, therefore, that the Uniform Act
should have adopted the 90 day approach.133
The Uniform Act thus has serious deficiencies in its annul-
ment provisions. Other than providing parents with a tool to
131. Several states now provide that a judge has discretion to refuse
an annulment. The Utah statute reads in part: "[T]he court may, in
its discretion, refuse to grant an annulment if it finds that it is in the
best interest of the parties. . . 2" UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-17.3 (1969).
132. UNinom ACT § 208(c), Second Tentative Draft. Texas now
has such a provision. See TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. § 2.41 (1971).
133. An exception might be needed for those cases in which the
marriage had been concealed from the parents.
[Vol. 57:179
UNIFORM MARRIAGE ACT
set aside the marriage, it serves no purpose that could not be
served by divorce. Furthermore, the wisdom of allowing mar-
riages to be annulled by parents is questionable. Therefore
either the annulment provisions should have been omitted or,
at least, the judge should have been given discretion to re-
fuse an annulment.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is a significant risk of divorce in marriages by parties
in their teens, yet the present system of controls designed to
reduce divorce has not achieved a level of effectiveness that jus-
tifies the invasion of individual liberty. Perhaps the real issue
is whether any system of controls can influence the teenage
couple's decision to marry. There is ample reason to advise
against youthful marriage, but if cultural and sociological var-
iants, such as the stage of industrialization or the availability of
premarital intercourse, determine the age at which parties form
a legal or extralegal husband-wife relationship, and if the law
(and parental or judicial consent) is of no account, then withhold-
ing legal sanction may only force couples to maintain their rela-
tionship without the legal title of man and wife. Another ques-
tion is whether any analysis, be it provided by parents, a judge
or a social worker, can provide reliable evaluation of proposed
marriages. If not, restrictions might reduce the number of teen-
age marriages without ensuring that those allowed will succeed.
Assuming that the law can deter teenage marriage, judicial
or administrative review of parental consent is necessary and
desirable. It is also necessary to eliminate evasion of the law
through adoption of uniform state regulations, strict proof re-
quirements and severe penalties for those officials who under-
mine the law. The Uniform Act, by providing uniformity and
review of the parental refusal to consent, takes some steps in the
right direction.
Finally, a system of controls cannot hope to achieve the
goal of marital stability without a substantial emphasis on early
preparation for marriage. Serious consideration should also be
given to post-marital financial and counseling aids for youthful
marriages.
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